Jack H. Nagel their view, the improbability of one-party majorities under MMP provides a needed check on the leading party by compelling it to negotiate and compromise with smaller parties and thus produces better-considered, wiser, more moderate policies.
Representational fairness, in contrast, was a value that cut only one way, in favour of MMP. Because it allocates list seats by a compensatory formula, MMP is designed to ensure proportional representation (PR) for all parties that meet the party vote threshold or win an electorate seat, and no one disputed that it has fulfilled that promise. Besides fairness to parties, MMP also indirectly promotes more nearly proportional representation for ethnic minorities and women because parties have an incentive and a means to appeal for their party votes through nominations to lists. MMP, combined with retention of dedicated Mäori seats, has consistently elected Mäori MPs in numbers roughly commensurate to the Mäori population. MMP has also helped
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In the debate that culminated in the November 2011 referendum, arguments for and against New Zealand's mixedmember proportional (MMP) electoral system focused on two values: governmental strength and representational fairness.
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Both opponents and defenders of MMP treated governmental strength as an important consideration, but they assessed it differently. Advocates of change favoured the first-past-the-post (FPP) or supplementary member (SM) alternatives because they believed either would deliver a higher probability of singleparty majority governments. Under FPP ministries not requiring bargaining across party lines would form quickly after elections, avoid concessions to minorparty 'kingmakers' , act decisively to solve policy problems, and remain stable until the next election, when voters could hold them unambiguously accountable for performance in office. Supporters of MMP countered that the excessive power of one-party governments ('elective dictatorships') in 1984-1993 was a major reason why voters had chosen MMP over FPP in the 1992 and 1993 referendums. In elect higher percentages of women, Pasifika and Asian MPs. For many supporters of MMP, representational fairness is the primary goal and virtue of the system. Opponents did not attack this attribute, but they obviously gave it less weight. The decision of the Campaign for Change to support SM rather than FPP as the preferred alternative to MMP was no doubt a bow to the value of diversity in representation, but at a less than proportional level, so as to produce a greater likelihood of strong, one-party governments.
Discussions framed by the alleged trade-off between effective government and fair representation have been typical in debates over electoral systems worldwide. Both values are certainly important. From the viewpoint of modern democratic theory, however, one must apply four additional tests in order to evaluate the performance of any electoral system: (1) Do majorities rule? (2) Do governments represent the median voter? (3) Are there any permanent minorities or any parties perpetually in power? (4) Do minorities impose centrifugal policies?
Do majorities rule?
The real issue at stake in debates over governmental power is not so much whether the government is too strong or too weak, but whether the policies it enacts enjoy sufficient support outside Parliament. Although the FPP voting system is often justified (and analysed) in terms of majority rule, it awards every seat to the candidate winning a mere plurality of votes in the electorate, which need not be a true majority unless there are only two candidates.
1 When minor parties receive a non-trivial share of votes, as was true of every New Zealand election from 1954 on, the aggregation of plurality victories across the country typically 'manufactures' a parliamentary majority for the winning party, even though it may have received the support of less -often much less -than a majority of voters.
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After the last six elections under FPP (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) , over-representation of the governing party (it was always a single party) ranged from a low of 22% in 1987 to a high of 45% in 1990, with a mean of 37%.
3 As Jack Vowles (1991) elegantly put it: 'The essential flaw in our present [FPP] arrangements is a simple one: power is given to minorities who think they have a majority.' In contrast, although MMP does not guarantee perfectly proportional representation, it has dramatically reduced the boost given to the governing party or coalition. Their over-representation after the first six MMP elections ranged from a high of 8% for the first MMP government in 1996 down to zero in 2005, with an average of 4.7%. Over-representation of the government means that legislative majorities can rest on electoral bases comprising less -sometimes much less -than a majority of voters. Figure 1 illustrates this phenomenon, again comparing parliaments after the last six FPP elections with those after the first six elections under MMP. On the assumption that parties vote as unified blocs, the graph displays the percentage of popular votes received by the party or parties comprising a minimal parliamentary majority (also known as a 'minimum winning coalition').
4 Under FPP, a single party always had a majority of MPs in the immediate post-election period. The votes received by those governing parties ranged from near-majorities of 48% for Labour in 1987 and 47.8% for National in 1990 down to just 35.1% for National in 1993. Under MMP the figure becomes more complicated, because no majority government has formed except for the initial coalition of National and New Zealand First in 1996, which had a bare majority of 61 seats. To pass any bill, a minority government must depend on votes (or abstentions) from another party or parties. Most minority governments have had agreements of support or cooperation with more than one small party. The graph shows the electoral support for all the minimal winning coalitions a government could form with the aid of one or more of those minor parties (though of course some bills enjoyed broader assent). In 2008, for example, the bottom of the vertical line represents a parliamentary majority consisting of National and the Mäori Party, which together received 47.3% of the party vote.
The top of the line shows the vote for a legislative majority consisting of National and the Green Party, with which National had an agreement of co-operation, albeit a very limited one. Together they won 51.7% of party votes. The circle shows the mean popular support for all minimal legislative majorities that the National government could achieve, which was 49.2%.
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In the last six elections under FPP, the electoral support for parliamentary majorities fluctuated widely, but never reached an absolute majority. Its average Evaluating Democracy in New Zealand under MMP 0% 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 (Downs, 1957) . Unfortunately, recent evidence from comparative politics shows that FPP systems on the whole perform less well than PR according to the median test (Powell, 2000; McDonald and Budge, 2005 Figure 2 shows the left-right economic positions that I posit for all significant parties that contested one or more elections from 1978 to 2011 -as before, the last six under FPP and the first six under MMP. 2) We must assume that the left-right policy preferences of voters correspond to the positions of the parties they vote for. Again, this is obviously not true in many instances: voters may choose according to non-economic issues, their liking for party leaders, or the overall state of the economy; but this assumption also seems reasonable as a first approximation, for purposes of a broad-brush analysis. Drawing on those two assumptions and the vote totals received by parties enables us to determine the party chosen by the median voter in each election. 6 In Table 1 , the first column lists those parties. Subsequent columns answer three tests of whether the median voter's position was likely to influence legislation: First, was the party of the median voter also the party of the median MP on conventional left-right issues? Second, was the party favoured by the median voter a party of government, either as a one-party government or as a member of a coalition? Third, if the median voter's party was not in government, did it sign a formal agreement of support or co-operation with the government?
As Table 1 shows, not one of the last six parliaments under FPP satisfied any of the median-voter tests. In five instances the median position was occupied by Social Credit or its successor, the Democrats. 7 In the final FPP election, one of the major parties -Labour -finally won the median mandate; but because the majority favouring the left and centre-left was split between the Alliance (18.2%) and Labour (34.7%), National emerged with a bare plurality of votes (35.1%) and an equally bare majority of MPs (50 of 99).
The record under MMP is dramatically different. After the first four MMP elections, the party of the median voter was both the party of the median MP and a party of government. In 2008, 
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tiny United Future was the party of the median voter in the electorate, but National was the party of the median MP as well as the main party of government. United Future's sole MP, Peter Dunne, wielded some influence through a support agreement with National which gave him two portfolios outside cabinet, as minister of revenue and associate minister of health. In 2011 United Future and National swapped the median distinctions, while National remained in government.
Are there permanent minorities or perpetual parties of government?
Although rule by majorities is a key test of democracy, the case for majority rule breaks down -both morally and practically -if any significant minority never shares in power. MMP guarantees minority parties a proportionate share of seats (if they surpass either of two thresholds), but fair representation for minorities is merely symbolic if they never achieve substantial influence over policy. Of course, after any given election or on any given legislative vote there will be winners and losers -a majority and a minority; but over time there should be multiple and changing majorities, so that every majority is temporary and no minority is permanent, thus providing every group or interest with opportunities to influence policy and a stake in the political system (Miller, 1983; McGann, 2006) . Assessing the health of democracy in this dynamic sense requires experience over time, which New Zealand has acquired after six elections under MMP. Table 2 demonstrates the sharing of influence since the introduction of MMP. The cells record the number of years following each election in which a group represented in Parliament enjoyed some influence over policy, either as part of a governing coalition (bold numerals) or through a formal agreement of support or co-operation with a minority government (italic numerals). The first eight rows represent political parties. The last row attempts to assess the influence of Mäori as a group by tracking the participation in governments of MPs representing Mäori electorates. There were, of course, other Mäori MPs elected from party lists or (less often) general electorates, but members elected from Mäori electorates, whether or not they stood as candidates of a predominantly Mäori party, should be especially attuned to, and inclined to advocate, the distinctive interests of Mäori people. In years when more than one party elected MPs in Mäori constituencies, the table credits Mäori Bold: years as governing party or member of governing coalition Italic: years with formal agreement of support or co-operation with government x: not represented in Parliament during this period * Ma -ori Party percentages based on years since 2004, when the party was founded. ** MPs representing Ma -ori electorates were sometimes from more than one party. In years marked by double asterisks, some MPs representing Ma -ori electorates had ties to government and some did not. See note 8 Sources: Malone, 2008, pp.46-7; Boston, 2011, pp.92-9; Miller and Curtin, 2011, p.112 ; plus news articles for 2011-. By scanning across the first eight rows of the table, one can readily see that all of the eight political parties have enjoyed periods of influence as a governing, supporting or co-operating party. In other words, no party has been a permanent minority, perpetually denied influence. The experience of Mäori under MMP is even more impressive. As the last row of Table 2 shows, at least some MPs representing Mäori electorates have been members of governing or allied parties continuously since the inception of MMP. The final two columns summarise the record by showing the percentage of time that each party and members from Mäori seats have had influence over government. The first of these columns covers 1996-2012, assuming that the National-led government elected in 2011 and its agreements with other parties remain effective for a year. The final column projects to 2014 on the assumption that current arrangements continue for the better part of three years, until a new election after a normal parliamentary term.
Not only has no party been permanently excluded, but also the sharing of power over time has been remarkably even. If the current alignment continues until 2014, the smallest share of time with influence for parties that existed in 1996 will be 28% for New Zealand First (or 33% excluding 2008-11, when the party had no MPs). The largest share is United Future's 72%. Three other parties, including National and Labour, will be at 50%. The corollary of these results is that no party has been perpetually in government. Although partisans mourn when their favourites are relegated to the opposition benches, the expectation that a party will always have power tends to breed complacency, opportunism and corruption. The fact that the two major parties have been equally often in government and opposition should be taken as a sign of the health of New Zealand democracy under MMP. It is also desirable that no smaller party or parties be perpetually in power. United Future's 72% is offset by the fact that for more than half of that time the party had only one MP, the durable Peter Dunne. As for the seemingly permanent incorporation of MPs representing Mäori electorates, that can be seen against the larger context of the 129 years before MMP, when Mäori were usually under-represented and marginalised. The continuous influence of Mäori MPs over ministries has brought little danger of stagnation, because those Mäori members have belonged to four different parties.
Do minorities impose centrifugal policies?
In one situation, minor-party influence over policies is entirely consistent with majority rule. That is the case when the minor party occupies the median position on an issue dimension and uses its voting power -either as a coalition partner or as an ad hoc ally on a particular bill -to moderate a relatively extreme policy that one of the major parties would otherwise prefer. In this scenario, the influence of the minor party enables an outcome closer to the preference of the median voter to prevail. Since the advent of MMP, both New Zealand First and United Future (in its various incarnations) have tried to play the centrist role on the main left-right spectrum.
Often, however, minor parties espouse policies that a majority would not endorse. Some stake out positions on the flanks of the primary dimension: ACT on the right, the Alliance/Progressives on the left. Frequently, small parties attract their most intense support by emphasising issues that cut across the conventional left-right dimension. For some minor parties, the cross-cutting dimension is their raison d'être and the source of their identity as a party. Environmental and related 'post-materialist' issues play that role for the Greens, as have Mäori concerns for several parties. In other cases, minor parties with a welldefined left-right identity try (perhaps opportunistically) to attract additional support by also taking up a cross-cutting issue -immigration for New Zealand First in 1996, social conservatism for United Future in 2002, and law and order for ACT in 2008.
When a small party advocates nonmajoritarian policies, it is not undesirable for it to win some concessions. If such a party continually had no success, the voters who support it could become permanently aggrieved, isolated and alienated from the body politic. In New Zealand, that danger is most obvious with respect to Mäori as a visible and self-conscious minority, but it could also apply to other groups who feel intensely about their concerns. On the other hand, if small parties exploit favourable bargaining positions to impose undiluted versions of their preferred policies, thus causing great distress among the majority, then their power is dangerous to the polity and difficult to defend from the viewpoint of democratic theory. A conspicuous contemporary example of this problem in a PR system is the ability of Shas and other ultra-orthodox parties is Israel to impose their religious policies against the wishes of the more tolerant and secular majority.
Critics of PR electoral systems often invoke such instances of minor parties ... if small parties exploit favourable bargaining positions to impose undiluted versions of their preferred policies, thus causing great distress among the majority, then their power is dangerous to the polity and difficult to defend from the viewpoint of democratic theory.
imposing unpopular policies. That was the essence of the 'tail wagging the dog' argument against MMP. In fact, however, the same phenomenon occurs -but less transparently -under FPP. 'Broad church' parties are themselves coalitions of factions with differing priorities. Their internal politics can result in a pattern of 'minorities rule' through explicit or implicit logrolls. That is how economic liberalisers in New Zealand enacted a radical, frequently unpopular programme under one-party governments in 1984-93 (Nagel, 1998) .
Have minorities that gained representation under MMP been able to impose extreme or unpopular policies? As an observer who has followed New Zealand politics only intermittently and mostly from afar, I am not equipped to answer this question, because it requires detailed knowledge of policies over the past 16 years. Nevertheless, it is my impression that governments under MMP have usually avoided paying high prices for small blocs of votes, whether organised through separate parties or as factions within a major party. A possible exception occurred in 2010, when John Key's government supported ACT's harsh three-strikes criminal justice policy, despite the reputed disagreement of National's own minister of justice, Simon Power, who did not manage the bill in Parliament.
9 More often, governments have conspicuously succeeded in resisting or moderating narrowly-based demands. Governments led by Helen Clark refused to accede to the ban on geneticallymodified foods desired by the Greens, and allowed Tariana Turia to walk out of the Labour caucus and launch the Mäori Party rather than capitulate to her on the foreshore and seabed issue. When the Mäori Party subsequently became part of the National-led government in 2008, Prime Minister Key managed to attract its support with concessions that were not too distressing to the Päkehä majority. Inability to prevail on their most cherished policies has surely contributed to the difficulty minor parties have had in maintaining electoral support (Bale and Bergman, 2006; Miller and Curtin, 2011) .
Although Prime Ministers Clark and Key have been impressively skilful at manoeuvring within the multi-party MMP environment, they have also benefited from favourable circumstances.
The possibility that a small party can wield power out of proportion to its numbers is no chimera. A party's relative bargaining power in a game based on votes can be measured using the Banzhaf power index, which is the number of times a party is critical to a winning coalition divided by the total number of times all parties are critical.
10 Party A is 'critical' to a coalition when the coalition wins with A's votes and loses without them. The relation between power and votes is not linear, but depends on configurations of voting blocs in relation to the number of votes required to win (typically a majority in legislatures). For example, if parties A, B and C have 51, 45 and 5 votes respectively, then any coalition with A is winning and any coalition without A loses. Thus, A's Banzhaf power equals 1, while B and C have no power. But if just one seat switches so that A has 50 votes and B 46, while C remains at 5, then each party is critical to two winning coalitions (A to AB and AC, B to AB and BC, and C to AC and BC) . Now all three parties have equal Banzhaf power (.33 each) -even little C. Table 3 displays parties' shares of seats and power following the six MMP elections. Both measures are expressed as decimals ranging from 0 to 1.0.
11 The two major parties appear on the left of the table, while minor parties are to the right. There are two important observations to make about this history. First, only in 1996 did a minor party have a share of power that was both considerably greater than its seat share and equal to the power of a major party. After that first MMP election, New Zealand First had 23% of the bargaining power, which was a 64% bonus over its seat share and equal to the power of the much larger Labour caucus. New Zealand First's actual power position was even more advantageous than those a priori numbers indicate. The power indexes in the table are based on all logically possible coalitions, but in fact certain coalitions were politically infeasible.
The ideological gulf between the Alliance and ACT ruled out any coalition that included both of those parties, and the longstanding rivalry for power between Labour and National apparently prevented serious consideration of a grand coalition of the two big parties. If one computes Banzhaf indexes based only on the remaining, feasible coalitions, then New Zealand First had 44% of the power, more than either of the major parties. National was second with 33%, and Labour and the Alliance trailed with 11% each. ACT and United had seats, but no power. Admitting coalitions that included both National and Labour would markedly change those results by reducing the power of New Zealand First.
Second, after every election since 1996 there was no clearly dominant power leader among the minor parties, and the multiple leaders had equal or nearly equal shares of power. There were two such leaders in 2005 (with a third not far behind); three in 2008 and 2011; and four in 1999 and 2002 . Moreover, as events proved, in each of those five parliaments, multiple minor parties were sufficiently
The parliamentary configurations Clark and Key faced enabled their minority governments to form legislative majorities with any of several partners, thus usually denying excessive bargaining power to any minor party.
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In short, the birth trauma of MMP in 1996 resulted not just from Winston Peters' hard bargaining, but also from the configuration of seats that gave him the power he so eagerly exploited; and from the unwillingness of National and Labour to consider a grand coalition. Similarly, the happier history of MMP after subsequent elections depended not only on the acumen of Helen Clark and John Key, but also on dispersal of seats and voting power among multiple minor parties. The parliamentary configurations Clark and Key faced enabled their minority governments to form legislative majorities with any of several partners, thus usually denying excessive bargaining power to any minor party.
Conditions (and choices) favouring healthy democracy under MMP
To sum up, after a rocky start MMP has had a strongly positive performance as judged by several tests from contemporary democratic theory. Parliamentary majorities have been based on electoral majorities or near-majorities. The party of the median voter has always been a party of government or, in one instance, a party allied with the government. All parties, and the Mäori minority, have participated in or influenced governments a significant share of the time; and no party has been perpetually in power. Minor parties have influenced legislation, but have seldom been able to impose polices that were strongly objectionable to a majority of voters.
Understanding the reasons for such favourable outcomes may help to perpetuate them in the future. I suggest that four interdependent conditions help account for the health of New Zealand's democracy under MMP: (a) a high degree of proportionality; (b) numerous minor parties in Parliament; (c) minority governments; and (d) the absence of pariah parties.
Proportionality
Consistently majoritarian outcomes -legislative majorities supported by electoral majorities and median-voter support for a party of governmentdepend on minimal deviations from proportionality between parties' seats and votes. Use of a PR formula and MMP's branding as a 'proportional' system do not guarantee highly proportional results, because the 5% threshold can easily result in numerous 'wasted' votes. Two initially under-appreciated features of New Zealand's version of MMP have lessened the impact of that threshold. These are, of course, the retention of Mäori electorates and the alternative threshold which allows any party winning an electorate seat to share proportionally in the allocation of list seats. On four occasions, minor parties that received less than 5% of the party vote achieved representation because they won Mäori electorates; and in six instances (marked by asterisks in Table 3 ) minor parties won list seats because they won a general electorate.
Multiple minor parties
Proportionality, aided by the two factors just mentioned, has contributed to the presence in Parliament of multiple minor parties, ranging from a low of four in 1996, through five in 1999, 2002 and 2008, to six in 2005 and 2011 . Permissive electoral rules alone do not guarantee that minor parties will win seats. Also important has been the societal potential for multiple cross-cutting issue dimensions and the willingness of politicians to exploit some of them. Before the first MMP election, I predicted that the dominant left-right dimension by itself would probably support only two parties in the long run, and that the staying power of the cleavage between economic liberalisers and interventionists (which had spawned three new parties) was limited (Nagel, 1994; Curtin and Miller, 2010) . The withering away of the Alliance/ Progressives and ACT has confirmed that prediction. By the same logic, would-be centrist parties have prospered only by also campaigning on one or more crosscutting issues, such as immigration and corruption for New Zealand First or social conservatism for United Future New Zealand in 2002. Other minor parties have defined themselves by stands on more enduring cross-cutting dimensions, post-materialism and ethnicity. Thus the Greens have been present in every MMP parliament (including as a constituent party of the Alliance in 1996), and minor parties depending on Mäori voters and electorates have won seats in four of the six MMP elections.
Minority governments
Tempted by the bait of seemingly complete control that an absolute majority confers, a party can be lured into paying a high price to swing voters or to a pivotal minor party. The facade of majority government (Gambetta and Warner, 2004) . In Israel, the continuing excessive power of ultraorthodox parties results in part from the same cause. The Knesset typically includes several small Arab parties, which usually win 5-10% of seats, but other parties have been unwilling to depend on votes from these non-Zionist parties for fear of provoking a backlash among Jewish voters. 12 Therefore, major parties often have no alternative but to deal with the ultra-orthodox, who frequently occupy the pivotal position when governments must be formed. Thus the presence of significant pariah parties directly manifests one democratic failure -the existence of a permanent minority -and indirectly causes two others -perpetually governing parties and excessively powerful minor parties. The success of MMP in New Zealand has resulted in part from the absence of any perpetual pariah, although New Zealand First (or, more precisely, its leader) has at times held that dubious distinction vis-à-vis one or the other of the major parties, which helps explain its last-place position in Table 2 .
Practical implications
I will conclude with implications of the preceding analysis for the Electoral Commission as it reviews the finer points of MMP, and for political leaders as they continue to operate within an MMP system.
The first question on the Electoral Commission's review agenda is whether to change either of the alternative thresholds a party must reach to be included in the allocation of list seats. As I have tried to show, a high degree of proportionality is important not just to serve representational values, but also to achieve majoritarian goals: a government supported by a majority of voters, a governing party that represents the median voter, and specific policies acceptable to majorities that may -and should -differ from issue to issue. The higher the threshold, the less the likelihood that a PR system will actually deliver a high degree of proportionality. Thus far, New Zealand's alternative threshold of an electorate victory has partially offset the rather high main threshold of 5% of the party vote. If the Electoral Commission decides to eliminate the electorate route to list seats (and there are reasons to do so that this article has not addressed), then I would recommend lowering the party vote threshold to 3%.
To political leaders, especially of the major parties, the main implication of this analysis is simply to keep up the good work. After early learning pains, they have shown ingenuity and skill in managing the tricky processes of governmentformation and legislation in a multiparty environment. Still, it may be worth underscoring three guidelines that can contribute to continued success. First, minority governments are a good thing, especially if the alternative is to make binding commitments that give too much power to minorities, whether voting blocs in the electorate or parties in parliament. Second, room to manoeuvre, and thus to serve democratic ends, increases when no party is treated as a pariah. A party may arise that is truly beyond the paleanti-democratic, racist, or opposed to the continued existence of New Zealand as a nation -but, short of such extremes, it is
The success of MMP in New Zealand has resulted in part from the absence of any perpetual pariah, although New Zealand First (or, more precisely, its leader) has at times held that dubious distinction vis-à-vis one or the other of the major parties...
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best to look beyond difficult personalities and personal animosities to the greater good. Third, if an anti-system party does arise, or if a minor party excessively exploits an unusually strong power position, then major parties always have the recourse of putting aside their historic rivalry by forming a temporary grand coalition.
1 The more accurate term for FPP is 'single-member plurality' (SMP), but I will follow the labels used in the referendum. 2 Indeed, as New Zealanders saw in 1978 and 1981, it is possible under FPP for a party to win a majority of seats even though it receives less than a plurality of votes nationwide. 3 Over-representation is calculated by dividing the party's percentage of seats by its percentage of votes, subtracting one, and then multiplying by 100. All votes and seats reported in this article are from the website of the New Zealand Electoral Commission or the commission's printed compendia. 4 A minimal majority commands a majority of MPs, but includes no party whose votes are not essential to pass a bill. 5 In 2008 there was one other legislative minimal majority -National and ACT, with a combined 48.6% of party votes. United Future also had a support agreement with National, but its single vote was never essential, as long as all members of National and one of the other co-operating parties voted for a measure. In 1999 there was only one minimal majority -the Labour-Alliance coalition plus the Greens; but the minority coalition could also reach a majority with the help of New Zealand First, with which it had no formal agreement. The 2002 Labour-Progressive government could prevail with the aid of either United Future or the Greens. In 2005, the Labour-Progressive government could pass bills with the support of NZ First plus United Future, or NZ First plus the Greens. Minimal winning coalitions in the current Parliament consist of National plus the Mäori Party or National plus ACT plus United Future. 6 To determine the party of the median voter, first adjust party votes to sum to 100% by correcting for fringe parties that received some votes but are not listed in Figure 2 . Then start with the party on the extreme left and cumulate party votes until the total exceeds 50%. The party that puts the total over 50% represents the median voter. Starting at the extreme right gives the same result as long as there is no exact 50-50 division. It might seem that the median voter test is merely another way of saying that the government rests on a numerical majority of votes, but that is not necessarily so. If an odd-bedfellows coalition formed between parties on the left and right wings, the party representing the median voter would not be included, even though the electoral support base of the government could exceed 50%. 7 Besides its idiosyncratic economic doctrines, Social Credit in its earlier days had appeals that could be characterised as right-wing, and it always depended heavily on protest voters, but by the 1970s it had 'evolved into a mildly reformist centre party' (Miller, 1985, p.212 Sorrenson (1986, pp.B-45-6) , the dependence of Peter Fraser's Labour government in 1946-49 on the votes of the four Mäori MPs was probably 'a significant factor' in its defeat. That dependence 'was ceaselessly panned in the pro-National press', as in cartoons that "showed Fraser forever pandering to a grass skirted Mäori mandate". The consistent influence of Mäori MPs over MMP mandate governments shows how far New Zealand has come.
